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Are Time Preference and Risk Preference Associated 






We investigate whether cognitive intelligence (IQ) and emotional intelligence (EQ) 
meaningfully correlate with time preference and risk preference, finding solid evidence 
in support. In the realm of time preference, high-EQ individuals are less subject to present 
(or future) bias, and they are more patient. Further, high-IQ subjects tend to exhibit 
preferences that conform to expected utility maximization. While recent research on the 
relationship between cognitive ability and preferences has provided important insights, 
our results suggest that both cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence matter. 
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Are Time Preference and Risk Preference Associated 





In today’s world, average people must face the responsibility of growing sufficient wealth 
to provide for retirement. Future wealth depends critically on the ability to save, in 
addition to a willingness to bear financial risk. The prospect for success, however, is of 
serious concern. Income inequality is on the rise and many people are severely lacking in 
their ability to grow wealth. A recent comprehensive study of tax, survey, and national 
account data provides a disconcerting picture of the financial situation for the typical 
American citizen (Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 2016). Since 1980, pre-tax income for the 
bottom 50% has been unchanged while the top 1% has benefited from sharp income 
increases. In fact, while in 1980 the top 1% earned about 27 times more than the bottom 
50%, now the top 1% earns 81 times more than the bottom 50%. The evidence suggests that 
this increase in inequality is in large part not due to higher wages at the top but instead 
results from gains on investments, including stocks and bonds. While the top 1% is 
certainly in a strong wealth position, one in three Americans has saved nothing 
whatsoever for retirement (Kirkham 2016).  
 
This environment presents a significant challenge to policymakers who hope to 
encourage wise financial decisions. In this paper, we report on peoples’ time and risk 
preferences and, in turn, seek to inform theory and policy. Prior research documents 
significant heterogeneity in financial decision-making, with age, sex, and income, among 
other variables, having predictive ability (e.g., Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden 2003; 
Barsky et al. 1997; Calvet and Sodini 2014). This paper adds to the literature by using an 
experimental method to explore whether a relationship exists between the key 
parameters in time- and risk-preference models and proxies for both cognitive ability and 




There is increasing evidence that cognitive ability, as commonly proxied by an 
intelligence quotient or IQ figure, has a meaningful relationship with the key preference 
parameters underlying financial decision-making.1 For example, Dohmen et al. (2010) 
find that those with higher levels of cognitive ability take on more risk. These people also 
save more.2 At the same time, research in psychology shows that those with high levels 
of emotional stability, as commonly proxied by an emotional quotient or EQ figure, have 
better life outcomes (Almlund et al. 2011), suggesting that EQ also may be an important 
factor that explains wise financial decisions. Emotional stability is defined by the 
American Psychology Association as “predictability and consistency in emotional reactions, 
with absence of rapid mood changes” (Almlund et al. 2011).3 Recent work documents the 
relationship between EQ and a key risk-taking preference parameter (Charupat et al. 
2013). 
 
Our experiment is designed to explore, uniquely we believe, whether a relationship exists 
between proxies for both cognitive ability (IQ) and emotional stability (EQ) and the key 
parameters in time and risk preference models. Specifically, we focus on quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting and (Cumulative) Prospect Theory (PT), both of which nest models 
grounded in traditional Expected Utility Theory (EUT). To preview, we find that both IQ 
and EQ independently matter, with EQ dominating for time preference and IQ for risk 
preference. We observe significant differences in preferences across sex. Interestingly, we 
                                               
1 IQ and cognitive ability are not strictly equivalent (Urbina 2011). However, it is reasonable to say that 
IQ, a metric resulting from various administered tests, is a noisy estimator of different aspects of multi-
faceted cognitive ability. For ease of exposition, we treat the acronym, IQ, and cognitive ability as 
congruent. 
2 Some evidence suggests that time preference and risk preference are related (Abdellaoui, Diecidue and 
Oencueler 2011; Andreoni and Sprenger 2012; Gerber and Rohde 2010). Here, like most other researchers, 
we treat them as separable. 
3 We use emotional stability as a measure of emotional intelligence, though the two are not strictly 
equivalent. Emotional intelligence is defined as “the subset of social intelligence that involves the ability 
to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this 
information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey and Meyer 1990). Emotional stability is a 
component of a trait family that some call Neuroticism/Emotional Stability and which is within the 
popular “Big Five” trait family model of personality psychology (Larsen and Buss 2017). Those low in 
emotional stability (or high in neuroticism) are often said to exhibit Negative Affectivity (NA) (Watson 
and Clark 1984). As we describe below, the emotion-based metric that we employ is a noisy proxy for 
emotional stability (as we have also said above in the context of IQ).  
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also observe that while some people’s preferences are consistent with traditional EUT, a 
majority are not. Many peoples’ choices are better categorized as consistent with PT. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review the literature on the impact of 
cognitive ability and emotional stability on time preference and risk preference, as well 
as the measurement of IQ and EQ. We also provide background on the time- and risk-
preference models employed here (namely quasi-hyperbolic discounting and prospect 
theory). Section 3 presents our hypotheses, and section 4 details our research design. The 
penultimate section presents our findings, and section 6 concludes.  
 
2. IQ, EQ, and time- and risk-preference models  
 
2.a. Cognitive ability  
 
An IQ score, derived from standardized tests, is typically used to measure a person’s 
cognitive ability. The IQ test was first developed at the beginning of the 20th century in 
France by Alfred Binet whose goal was to identify children in need of remedial help and 
later popularized in the United States with the Stanford-Binet IQ test (Wade and Tavris 
2017). Though the IQ test is commonly used to assess intelligence, psychologists continue 
to debate what aspects of cognitive ability are measured and even exactly what 
intelligence means (Gould 1994). A vast literature in psychology evaluates the usefulness 
of IQ in predicting achievement, including occupational success (Schmidt and Hunter 
1998).  
 
As for financial decision-making, the evidence suggests that those with higher levels of 
cognitive ability are able to save more while taking on more risk, and these findings are 
robust across subject pools. For example, with a sample of subjects at various U.S. 
universities, Frederick (2005) finds that those with higher cognitive ability are both more 
patient (i.e., have a lower rate of time preference) and less risk-averse. Dohmen et al. 
(2010) find similar results with a diverse sample of German citizens. Grinblatt, Keloharju, 
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and Linnainmaa (2011), using a large Finnish dataset, show that stock market 
participation is positively related to IQ after controlling for a host of other possible 
explanatory variables such as wealth, income, and age. Moreover, high-IQ individuals 
perform better when trading securities and exhibit fewer behavioral biases (Grinblatt, 
Keloharju, and Linnainmaa 2012).4 These tendencies are generally echoed in other 
research.5 
 
These studies use a variety of proxies for cognitive ability. Some study the relationship 
between IQ and financial decision-making with instruments developed by psychologists. 
A number of different instruments have been designed for particular practical purposes 
and to measure distinct facets of cognitive ability (Urbina 2011). The Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS), developed specifically for adults, is widely used. The 
drawback of this test (with its 11 modules), and many of its adaptations, is the lengthy 
time for administration, making it impractical for many experimental and survey studies. 
To alleviate time constraints, some researchers use a subset of the WAIS to measure 
cognitive ability. One example is Dohmen et al. (2010) in which two submodules of the 
WAIS proxy for cognitive ability. In other cases, due to the availability of unique data, 
researchers use alternative measures to proxy for IQ. For example, Grinblatt, Keloharju, 
and Linnainmaa (2011) study data for Finnish men who completed a 120-question test 
designed to measure intelligence at their induction into required military training.  
 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is an IQ measure that has practical benefits because 
it is a very short survey and responses are easy to evaluate (Frederick 2005). This test 
employs three simple questions that have correct numerical answers. In each case, there 
is an incorrect but intuitive answer, while the correct answer requires one to pause and 
                                               
4 For example, higher-IQ investors in their sample are less prone to the disposition effect, the tendency to 
hold on to poor-performing stocks while selling good performers.   
5 Ballinger et al. (2011) report significant correlation between IQ and saving in an experimental setting. 
Eckel et al. (2012) relate IQ and risk taking in a field study of high school students. We note, however, that 
there is some contrary evidence. Taylor (2013) reports that IQ and risk taking are positively correlated 
when choices are hypothetical but not in settings with real choices.  
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“cognitively reflect,” hence the name of the test. For example, consider the following 
question: 
 
A bat and ball cost $1.10. The bat costs one $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
 
A little thought indicates that the ball costs 5 cents and the bat $1.05 (for the required sum 
of $1.10 and difference of $1.) The incorrect answer naturally occurring to many people 
as the cost of the ball, however, is $0.10. People seem to anchor on the difference between 
$1.10 and $1.00, erroneously arriving at a cost of 10 cents for the ball. The other two 
questions of the CRT are in the same vein.6   
 
We employ the CRT in the present study as a proxy – albeit noisy – for IQ. As noted 
above, a number of measures are available. In addition to robustness across subject pools, 
financial behavior is generally consistent across the various tools that assess cognitive 
ability. Because of its ease of use and the fact that it has been shown to correlate not only 
with more extensive tests of cognitive ability but also with the behaviors that these tests 
are associated with (Frederick 2005), we chose the CRT to measure IQ.   
 
2.b. Emotional intelligence 
 
Compared to theories of cognitive ability, models of EQ are relatively new. The theory 
was first introduced in 1990 (Mayer, DiPaolo, and Salovey 1990; Salovey and Mayer 1990) 
and quickly gained much popular interest. The October 2, 1995 cover of Time magazine 
proclaimed that EQ “may be the best predictor of success in life.” Though EQ helps 
predict life outcomes including well-being, the Time claim probably took the predictive 
ability of the concept too far (Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade 2008). 
Psychologists report that people with higher EQ are less likely to procrastinate and less 
impulsive (Whiteside and Lynam 2001; Lee, Kelly, and Edwards 2006). When it comes to 
                                               
6 The complete survey appears in Appendix 1. The CRT questions are B-1 to B-3. 
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financial decision-making, research indicates that emotion plays a role in understanding 
how people respond to stimuli at the individual level. For example, Lo and Repin (2002) 
measure emotion using skin conductance and report that professional traders become 
more emotional when the market is moving up or down, as compared to non-event 
control periods. Another study by Johnson et al. (1993) finds that people are more likely 
to insure against emotionally vivid events. Emotion also has the power to explain 
individual behavioral anomalies, such as the disposition effect or the tendency to hold, 
suboptimally, losing investments longer than winning investments (Odean 1998). 
Summers and Duxbury (2012) provide evidence to support the view that emotion drives 
the disposition effect.  
 
Researchers have observed that an investor’s preference toward risk evolves in response 
to the external environment. For example, an increase in pessimism or anxiety in response 
to a negative external event may lead to a decrease in the individual’s risk tolerance. 
Consistent with this argument, Kaplanski and Levy (2010) report negative stock returns 
following aviation disasters as investors’ pessimistic mood depresses stock prices. 
Evidence also suggests that when individuals’ affective assessments change, their 
preferences change. Indeed, Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000) show that emotional forces 
mold loss aversion, which is the feeling that “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Loss aversion is associated with non-EUT preferences, including PT. 
In addition, researchers provide evidence that people’s evaluations of decision options 
change in response to stimuli. In both traditional Expected Utility Theory and Prospect 
Theory, people use a utility function, u(.), to evaluate outcomes and the option chosen is 
the one that maximizes the weighted average of the utility of the outcomes. In EUT, the 
weights are simple probabilities, whereas in PT the weights are probabilities that are 
transformed based on preferences regarding distance from impossibility and certainty. 
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), Kliger and Levy (2008), and Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) report 




Few studies directly examine emotional stability and financial decision-making. An 
exception is Charupat et al. (2013) who examine whether a precise measure of EQ 
correlates with curvature of the PT weighting function based on observed preferences. 
Probability weighting, commonly associated with PT, results in curvature of the 
weighting function with more curvature reflecting greater sensitivity to extreme 
probabilities. In contrast, lower curvature in the weighting function reflects preferences 
that are closer to EUT.7 Charupat et al. conclude that higher EQ is associated with EUT-
type preferences. 
 
We follow the approach of Charupat et al. (2013) to measure emotional stability. In 
personality psychology, a five-factor model known as the “Big Five” has received much 
support.8 One of the five trait groupings is often termed Neuroticism/Emotional 
Stability. People who are low in emotional stability exhibit neuroticism or negative 
affectivity (NA) (Watson and Clark 1984). Those high in emotional stability or EQ tend 
to exhibit calm and grace under pressure, while those low in EQ are often anxious, 
excitable and nervous. In gauging EQ, this metric measures the individual’s innate 
tendencies, rather than the ability of individual to overcome emotion.9  
 
Specifically, our instrument for EQ is based on the International Positive Affectivity-
Negative Affectivity Schedule – Short Form (I-PANAS-SF), proposed and tested for 
validity by Thompson (2007). Participants are asked how often their feelings tend in the 
direction of 10 adjectives, some of which correspond to negative emotions (“upset” is an 
example), others of which correspond to positive emotions (“attentive” is an example).10 
A 5-point Likert scale is used ranging from ‘1’ (never) to ‘5’ (always). The average score 
                                               
7 Recall that the traditional theory assumes the probabilities are the weights, giving a linear relationship. 
8 See Larsen and Buss (2017). 
9 An individual’s innate tendencies are one facet of emotional intelligence as first conceptualized by 
Salovey and Mayer (1990). They defined emotional intelligence as “the ability to monitor one’s own and 
others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's 
thinking and actions.” In their view, there are three fundamental aspects of emotional intelligence: 
appraisal and expression of emotion, regulation of emotion, and utilization of emotion. 
10 The I-PANAS-SF questions are A-1 to A-10 in Appendix 1. 
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on the five negative adjectives (which is called “negative affectivity” or NA) is our 
proxy for EQ, with low average values implying high EQ. In specifying our EQ 
measure, we use 5 minus NA so that a higher EQ value implies high EQ, which allows 
easier interpretation of regression results.  
 
Though not our primary focus, we also investigate whether positive affectivity impacts 
preferences. The average score on the five positive adjectives yields “positive 
affectivity” (PA), the tendency to experience positive emotions. Prior evidence suggests 
that positive emotions can play a role in improved decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al. 
1997) and, thus, it is possible that PA impacts time and risk preferences. 
 
2.c. Time preference and the quasi-hyperbolic discount function parameters  
 
Time preference has important effects on wealth accumulation. In the traditional model, 
people discount future cash flows exponentially at a constant rate of ρ, with more patient 
individuals having a lower subjective discount rate. Though discounting over time at a 
constant rate is taken to be a valid account of conventional behavior at least since 
Samuelson’s (1937) description of utility maximization, the empirical evidence has often 
not been supportive. As Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001, p. 855) state, “empirical 
patterns [in saving]... are more easily explained if one steps outside the framework of 
rational, far-sighted optimization.” In this spirit, Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) 
estimate the following general function proposed by Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter 
(2010):11 
 
(1)				%(t; 	ρ, β, θ) = β(1 − (1 − θ)ρt)
.
(./0)          for t > 0 
 
where ρ is the pure rate of time preference, β is present bias, and θ is “hyperbolicity.” An 
individual who is present-biased associates a cost to future cash flows, as compared to a 
                                               
11 Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) provide a comprehensive review of time preference. 
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reward received today (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Hyperbolic discounting implies a 
declining rate of time preference, as reported in empirical studies on intertemporal choice 
(Thaler 1981). When θ=1 (in the limit) equation (1) reduces to the quasi-hyperbolic 
discount function common in much research: 
 
(2)				%(t; 	ρ, β) = βexp567          for t > 0 
 
Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) find that when they do not constrain θ, there is little 
improvement in the R-squared as compared to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. So in the 
interest of reducing the number of parameters that must be estimated as well as to 
maintain clarity of interpretation for the remaining parameters, we estimate (2). 
    
2.d. Risk preference and the parameters of prospect theory 
 
In addition to time preference, risk preference significantly impacts people’s ability to 
grow wealth. In traditional EUT, people evaluate the utility of all possible outcomes and 
choose the option that gives the highest weighted average, where the weights (89) are 
simple probabilities. Similarly, in PT people choose the best outcome but use transformed 
weights that depend on the distance of the probability from impossibility and certainty 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Quiggin 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1992).12 In either 
case, the utility function can be expressed as: 
 




As is conventional, the PT utility function is modelled with the following two-part power 
function: 
                                               
12 Prospect theory is not the only positive theory of decision-making under risk and uncertainty. It is 
however the most popular one, in large part because it generally performs quite well (Barberis 2013). 
Nevertheless, there are cases where it fails (e.g., Baltussen, Post and van Vliet 2006). See Wakker (2010) 




(4D)					>(?) = ?E,			0	 < 	a			if	?		³		0 
(4J)					>(?) = −K(−?)L,			0	 < J, K		if	? < 	0 
 
where typically it is found that 0	 < 	a	 < 	1 and 0	 < J < 	1, reflecting concavity for gains 
and convexity for losses; and λ > 1, because people are loss-averse.  
 
Instead of weighting values by probabilities as in EUT, prospect theory uses transformed 
probabilities to generate “decision weights.” If all outcomes are non-negative, they are 
first ordered as z1 > z2 > ... > zn-1 > zn. Corresponding probabilities are written as 
MB, MN,…	M@5B, M@. Then the rank of each outcome is calculated, where rank is defined to 
be the probability of receiving a superior outcome (so the rank of ?P is ∑ M9P5B9AB ). The 
appropriate decision weight attached to ?9 is the difference between the transformed rank 
of the next-best outcome ?9QB and the transformed rank of ?9,  
 
(5)					89 = 	S(MB + MN + ⋯+ M9) − S(MB + MN + ⋯+ M95B)	 
 
In our experiment, we only consider simple binary prospects. When both outcomes are 
in the same domain (3) reduces to (3’):  
 
(3′)					;(<) = 	S(MB)W(?B) + [1 − S(MB)]>(?N) 
 
For the probability weighting function, Prelec’s (1998) single-parameter axiomatically-
derived function, which also tends to fit the data well (Stott 2006), is used: 
 
(6D)					S(M) = [\]	[−(−^_(M))`],				0 < a	bc	?		³		0		 
(6J)					S(M) = [\]	[−(−^_(M))d],				0 < e	bc	?	 < 0 
 
Given that typically α and b are close to each other, as are γ and δ (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992), to conserve on parameter estimation we impose equality restrictions 
11 
 
for both cases in our estimation, yielding: 
 
(4D)					>(?) = ?E,			0	 < 	a			if	?		³		0 
(4J′)					>(?) = −K(−?)a,			0	 < a, K		if	? < 	0 
(6D′)					S(M) = [\]	[−(−^_(M))`],				0 < a,	  for all z. 
  
We estimate (4a), (4b’), and (6a’) to reduce the number of parameters estimated and to 
maintain the clarity of interpretation for the remaining parameters. As described 
subsequently, estimates of α, γ, and λ provide insight into the risk preferences of our 
experimental participants. If PT preferences describe risk taking, three parameters govern 
choice when facing risk: utility function curvature, loss aversion, and probability 
weighting. Each influences the willingness of an individual to bear risk, with greater 
curvature, loss aversion, and (usually) probability weighting all leading to less risk 
taking.13 
 
2.e. Additional preference determinants 
 
Prior research reports patterns in patience and risk taking related to demographics. 
Research on behavior related to time preference stresses psychological determinants, 
including the uncertain nature of future events, the bequest motive and familial altruism, 
the propensity to exercise self-restraint, and the systematic tendency to underestimate 
future wants (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002). Recently, Brown, Ivkovic, 
and Weisbenner (2015) show that patience is associated with good health, longer time 
horizon, parenthood, income, and few liquidity constraints. Other subtle determinants 
are important, including nurture (Nguyen 2011), transparency (Mishra et al. 2013), and 
uncertainty surrounding the adequacy of savings (van Schie, Donkers, and Dellaert 2012).        
 
                                               
13 Low values of the parameter of a single-parameter probability weighting function imply that the 
weight for the high-wealth outcome is for most probabilities levels less than the probability (hence 
inducing risk aversion). An exception is for low-probability events, resulting in the popularity of lottery 
tickets.   
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For risk preference, older people who are closer to retirement, as they should, take on less 
risk because they have less time to recover from adverse market outcomes (Ameriks and 
Zeldes 2004). In contrast, high-income, high-net worth people invest a larger proportion 
of their portfolios in risky assets because they have a smaller commitment to expenditures 
on consumption (Calvet and Sodini 2014). Along the same lines, people who have 
acquired job seniority and are married tend to be less risk-averse because they have more 
financial security (Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden 2003). Holding other factors constant, 
men are less risk-averse (Barsky et al. 1997). In addition to demographic factors, there are 
other, more subtle determinants of risk preference, including genetics (Barnea, Cronqvist, 
and Siege 2010; Cesarini et al. 2010), culture (Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper 2010), recent 
experience (Tinsley, Dillon, and Cronin 2012), school environment (Eckel et al. 2012), 
timing of risk resolution (van Winden, Krawczyk, and Hopfensitz 2011), openness to 
advice and a planner mentality (Bhandari and Deaves 2008), and expertise (von 
Gaudecker, van Soest and Wengstroem 2012).   
 
Researchers have documented the importance of sex when it comes to IQ, EQ, and risk 
and time preferences. In general, women are more risk-averse than men (Barsky et al. 
1997; Booth et al. 2014; Booth and Katic 2012; Frederick 2005; Schubert, et al. 1999)). More 
specifically, women are less risk-taking than men because of differences in probability 
weighting, rather than in differences in their value functions (Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro, 
and Schubert 2006). Furthermore, women tend to be less sensitive than men to probability 
changes, though women more strongly underestimate large probabilities of gains. Other 
research reports that pre-existing good mood is significantly associated with women’s 
probability weights, whereas men appear to be less sensitive to mood effects (Fehr-Duda 
et al. 2011).  Instead, men appear to apply more mechanical decision-making criteria.  
 
While Dohmen et al. (2010) find that individuals with high cognitive ability take more 
risk in lottery experiments and are more patient, the relationship is somewhat weaker for 
females. In his study on risk and time preferences with the CRT proxy for IQ, Frederick 
(2005) finds that men have higher CRT scores than women, and that women’s mistakes 
13 
 
on the CRT tend to be of the intuitive variety more than men’s mistakes. They also find 
that CRT scores are more highly correlated with risk preference for men than for women, 
and that CRT scores are more highly correlated with time preference for women than for 
men. The relationship between CRT scores and patience in women is in line with the 
findings of Shoda et al. (1990), who find that patience in preschool girls is strongly related 
to their subsequent SAT scores (which is one indicator of cognitive ability), but no such 
relationship exists for boys.  Oechssler et al. (2009) echo the findings of Frederick (2005), 




Though still in its infancy, the existing literature suggests that higher IQ and EQ push 
people toward the traditional view of preferences. For example, for time preference, the 
typical assumption is that people discount future cash flows at a constant rate. But, 
Walther (2010) relates anticipated emotions to hyperbolic discounting, in which case the 
rate of time preference is not constant. In addition, the evidence presents a strong case 
against exponential discounting (Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter 2010). Recall that with 
present bias β<1, whereas with future bias β>1. Therefore, β=1 can be said to be consistent 
with a conventional view of time preference. We specify β*=|1-β|, so that the deviation 
of β from one (β*) should equal zero. As for ρ, the pure rate of time preference, there is 
no “right” answer, but as Dohmen et al. (2010) argue, an unreasonably high pure rate of 
time preference is difficult to rationalize with existing models of preferences.  
 
As for risk preference, EUT (non-weighted) probabilities emerge as g approaches 1. 
Further, if λ=1, there is no loss aversion, again consistent with EUT. For α, the prediction 
is less clear. Rabin (2000) has shown that EUT implies virtually no risk aversion for small 
to moderate gambles, because otherwise unreasonably high degress of risk aversion 
would result for large gambles. Taken together, α = g = λ = 1 is the gold standard for 
14 
 
traditional, EUT-like behavior.14 Therefore, in our examination of revealed risk 
preferences, we let α*=|1-α|, γ*=|1-γ| and λ*=|1-λ|, so that EUT implies that α* = γ* = 
λ* = 0.  
 
This study uniquely examines the role of both IQ and EQ in time and risk preferences. We 
conjecture that the two independently matter: namely, higher IQ and higher EQ should 
push people in the direction of traditional behavior. We posit two hypotheses are 
consistent with this conjecture: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Higher IQ and higher EQ are associated with time preferences that are 
closer to traditional time preferences. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher IQ and higher EQ are associated with risk preferences that are 
closer to traditional, EUT-type risk preferences.  
 
If the time preferences of people with higher IQ and higher EQ are closer to traditional 
expectations, we will observe that they are more present-indifferent (lower β*) and have 
a lower rate of pure time preference (lower ρ). As for risk preferences, if the risk 
preferences of people with higher IQ and higher EQ are closer to traditional expectations, 
we will observe that they are closer to risk neutral (lower α*), more neutral to losses 
(lower λ*), and have less probability weighting (lower γ*). In the following section, we 
describe our experimental method before turning to tests of these hypotheses. 
 
4. Experimental design 
 
4.a. Basic setup 
 
The experiment was conducted at a large, public university on back-to-back days, with 
                                               
14 Koebberling and Wakker (2005) provide a decomposition of risk aversion into these three parameters. 
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four sessions being held on the first day and three on the second. There were 146 useable 
participant responses.15  Subjects, recruited via advertisements and a mass e-mails to all 
junior and senior undergraduate business students, were given paper-and-pencil 
question sets, which included detailed instructions on procedures. These appear in 
Appendices 1, 2 and 3.   
 
The survey consists of 25 questions in 5 blocks. There are 4 versions of the survey with 
the only difference being the positioning of the question blocks in order to obviate 
ordering effects. We include one version in Appendix 1 for illustration. In this version of 
the experimental instrument, section A consists of the 10 I-PANAS-SF questions, section 
B includes the 3 CRT questions, section C uses 3 question sets to elicit 3 risk-preference 
parameters, section D gives the 2 sets of questions designed to elicit the 2 time-preference 
parameters, and section E includes demographic questions such as sex, age, year in 
university, and the number of university courses potentially helpful for the exercise at 
hand previously completed or currently in progress.16 It took virtually all subjects less 
than one hour to complete the survey. 
 
4.b. Elicitation of risk-preference parameters 
 
The risk-preference elicitation procedure follows closely Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen 
(2010).17 The survey includes three question sets, each comprised of a series of paired 
prospects (A vs. B). Subjects choose the preferred prospect for each pair. Going down the 
rows of paired prospects, B becomes relatively more attractive to A, as was clearly 
detailed for subjects in the instructions. Thus, if preference switched from A to B at a 
                                               
15 While there were 150 participants, 4 responses were not useable. One participant was a geology major, 
and was discarded to keep the pool entirely business students. Another excluded participant was taking a 
behavioral finance course with one of the experiment administrators. According to the university’s ethics 
board, students currently taking courses with the experiment administrator cannot be included in the 
subject pool. A third participant’s time preference response was contrary to dominance suggesting 
obvious confusion. The fourth participant did not complete the question sets. 
16 Specifically, the survey refers to courses in economics, finance, math, and statistics. All participants had 
taken at least basic courses in finance/economics and probability/statistics. 
17 This instrument follows Holt and Laury (2002). 
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particular row, it was clearly illogical to switch back later. There were then three 
possibilities: a subject could always prefer A; she could always prefer B; or initially she 
could prefer A, but switch to a preference for B. We calculated certainty equivalents based 
on the row at which a subject switched between A and B. The first two question sets 
yielded estimates of the risk-preference parameters, α and γ, while the third question set 
yielded estimates of λ, the loss-aversion parameter. 
 
 
4.c. Elicitation of time-preference parameters 
 
The elicitation procedure for the two time-preference parameters is similar to that for the 
risk-preference parameters and included two sets of questions.18 The first set asks subjects 
to make choices between money received in one week and money received in two weeks, 
yielding an estimate of the (pure) rate of time preference. The second set asks for choices 
between money received “today” vs. money received in one week, yielding an estimate 
of present bias.19   
 
4.d. Incentive compatibility 
 
The time- and risk-preference questions were rendered incentive-compatible as follows. 
As the instructions detailed, 4 students were randomly selected at the end of each session. 
Two of the selected students received monetary compensation based on their responses 
to the time-preference questions and the other 2 selected students received compensation 
based on the risk-preference questions. For time preference, the survey included 35 
questions (18 choices in the first question set and 17 more in the second (choices 19-35)). 
Each of the 4 selected students randomly chose a card (independently and with 
                                               
18 There are critics of this sort of elicitation procedure. For example, it has been shown that time 
preference may be impacted by market conditions (Krupka and Stephens 2013). 
19 More specifically, “today” meant that a student had to report to the office of one of the experimenters at 
the end of the day to collect payment. This approach is designed to equalize the “hassle factor” for 
immediate vs. deferred choices. 
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replacement) from a set numbered ‘1’ to ’35.’ The number chosen was then the row that 
determined their cash payment according to stated time preference. For example, if in the 
case of a time-preference question card ‘25’ were chosen (corresponding to the seventh 
row of the second time-preference question set), a student who had chosen A would 
receive $100 today while a student who had chosen B would receive $110 in one week. 
As for the risk-preference instrument, the survey also included 35 questions (14 choices 
in the first question set, 14 more in the second (choices 15-28), and 7 more in the third (29-
35)).20 The risk-preference questions required a third level of randomness. While as in the 
case of the time-preference questions, the first level dictated which students were eligible 
and the second level which choice was operative, the third level “played out” the random 
draw. Specifically, the subject chose a card from a set numbered ‘1’ to ’10,’ with high card 
numbers corresponding to high-payout probabilities. For example, for row 10 and a 
subject choice of B, the card ‘10’ awarded the subject $150 (because there was a 10% 
probability of the high payout) and all other cards awarded $2.50. 
 
5. Empirical findings 
 
5.a. Characteristics of the data 
 
Panel A of Table 1 details variable definitions, Panel B reports descriptive statistics for all 
variables, and Panel C presents a correlation matrix. Measurement of IQ, EQ, and PA is 
described above in sections 2.a. and 2.b. In addition to the demographic variables SEX, 
AGE, YR, and EDU, a number of time- and risk-preference variables are of interest. 
 
The first variable reported in the descriptive statistics is the CRT score, our measure of 
IQ. For our sample, the average CRT score is 1.60, somewhat below the 2.18 found among 
MIT students but above the 0.57 found among University of Toledo students (Frederick 
2005). The average EQ score is 2.73, quite close to the 2.42 level found by Charupat et al. 
                                               
20 One question in the third question set is identical to the previous row, allowing for a check on 
inattentiveness. None of the participants were deemed to be inattentive. 
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(2013) using the same NA proxy for EQ. As for positive affectivity, the average is 3.36. 
Our sample includes more female participants (56%) than male. Our average participant 
is 21-years-old, in the third year of university study, and has completed 10 relevant 
courses in economics, finance, and statistics.  
 
The time-preference parameter, β, measures present bias. Somewhat surprisingly, this 
sample lacks present bias in the aggregate.21 While many participants do exhibit present 
bias (β < 1.0), many others exhibit future bias (β > 1.0), and our average is quite close to 
one (β = 1.023). In addition, while the pure rate of time preference is quite high, with a 
mean of 10% per week, others have also reported implausibly high subjective discount 
rates (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002).   
 
Panel B of Table 1 next reports on our risk-preference measures. With the exception of 
loss aversion (λ), the risk-preference parameters are, on average, quite close to those 
reported elsewhere. The median values are α = 0.86, γ = 0.75, and λ = 1.60, as compared 
to the estimates of 0.88, 0.61, and 2.25 reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It is 
important to note that for some participants there are estimates of α above unity 
(implying risk seeking) and of γ above unity (implying reverse-S-shaped probability 
weighting). As for λ, below one (implying loss seeking) is almost as common as above 
one (i.e., loss aversion).  
 
Correlations give us a sense of what we might find when we perform regression analysis. 
In the regression analysis reported subsequently, we specify the dependent variables as 
absolute deviations from the values expected in traditional models, as reflected in 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. We believe that regressions with α*, γ* and λ* as dependent variables 
are more meaningful because lower values of α*, γ* and λ* indicate preferences that are 
more consistent with EUT-type preferences. Turning to the third panel of Table 1, a few 
salient tendencies are apparent. IQ and EQ are virtually uncorrelated, suggesting the two 
                                               
21 Indeed, hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting is quite often not found (e.g., Meyer 2013). 
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key psychometric variables are different constructs. High IQ is positively correlated with 
being male (SEX = 1.0 for males) and negatively correlated with the 3 risk-preference 
parameter deviations. We observe a weak positive correlation between EQ and SEX (p = 
0.091), while there is significant negative correlation between EQ and both weighting 
function curvature and present or future bias. Further, most of the parameter deviation 
pair-wise correlations are positive, implying that preference deviations from traditional 
models are systematic. Interestingly, present bias, β, and pure rate of time preference, ρ, 
are significantly positively correlated. Finally, consistent with Charupat et al. (2013), EQ 
and PA are positively correlated. 
 
5.b. Do IQ and EQ explain time preference? 
 
In Table 2 we present regression results for the absolute deviation from one of present 
bias (β*) and the pure rate of time preference (ρ). These two parameters are regressed on 
IQ, EQ, and positive affectivity (PA) and the demographic variables SEX, AGE, YR, and 
EDU, as well as the interactions of all variables with SEX. As reflected in Hypothesis 1, 
our expectation for IQ and EQ is that the estimated coefficients will be negative: higher 
IQ and EQ are expected to lead to preferences that are in line with the traditional view, 
which should imply lower values of β* and ρ. For each dependent variable, we present 2 
regressions: first, with IQ, EQ, PA, SEX, and interactions as dependent variables; and, 
second, with additional demographic variables including AGE, YR, and EDU plus their 
interactions. We include these control variables as prior research, as discussed earlier, 
reports that time preference is related to demographics. 
 
The estimates indicate some statistically significant relationships. Beginning with β*, the 
coefficient of EQ is negative and statistically significant at 10%, but only in the expanded 
regression, suggesting that EQ is associated with the lack of present (or future) bias. The 
only other significant determinant of β* is the interaction of age and sex, which suggests 
that older men are less likely to exhibit present (or future) bias. For the pure rate of time 
preference, EQ is significantly associated with lower rates of time preference in both 
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regressions. While SEX alone does not play a role in the rate of time preference, its 
interaction with EQ is a significant determinant. The evidence suggests that men with 
higher EQ have lower discount rates and are thus more patient. 
In sum, the evidence provides some support for our first hypothesis.  There is evidence 
that participants with higher EQ have lower values of both β* and ρ, suggesting their 
preferences are more consistent with the traditional view. 22  
  
5.c. Do IQ and EQ explain risk preference? 
 
In Table 3 we present regression results for the risk-preference parameters. More 
precisely, the dependent variables include the absolute deviations from one of utility 
function curvature (α*), probability weighting (γ*), and loss aversion (λ*). The 
explanatory variables are as in the previous section. Once again, our expectations as 
reflected in Hypothesis 2 are that the coefficients of IQ and EQ will be negative: higher 
IQ and EQ are anticipated to lead to EUT-type preferences, which in turn implies lower 
deviations of α, γ and λ from one. 
 
The estimates reported in Table 3 suggest that cognitive capacity has a strong impact on 
risk preference. The coefficients of all three parameter deviations are negative and 
significantly different from zero in all regressions. Participants with higher measured IQ 
exhibit preferences that are more in line with traditional EUT.  We also observe that SEX 
has an important influence on risk preference. For both probability weighting (γ*) and 
loss aversion (λ*), the preferences of men are more consistent with the traditional view. 
In the case of γ*, several additional regularities emerge. First, the tendency of IQ to push 
preferences in the direction of the traditional view is stronger for males. Second, 
                                               
22 As mentioned in the introduction, there is a strand of literature that investigates the relationship 
between risk and time preferences for individuals. Their main finding is that there is a correlation 
between risk and time preferences. We test whether including risk preference deviation parameters (α*, 
γ*, λ*) would change the results of time preference regressions that have β* and ρ as the dependent 
variables. In untabulated results, we find that for both β* and ρ, EQ is negative and significant. It is 
important to note that EQ remains a significant factor in predicting time preferences even after 
controlling for risk preferences. 
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consistent with Charupat et al. (2013), higher EQ leads to less probability weighting (but 
only for males). And, third, higher PA also leads to more traditional preferences. This 
finding is consistent with prior evidence that positive emotions impact decision-making 
(e.g., Bechara et al. 1997). 
 
In sum, we produce evidence supporting our second hypothesis. While EQ, more 
narrowly, is shown to have impact for males in the case of probability weighting, IQ is 
the dominant psychometric measure that affects risk preference, and the relationship is 
stronger for men. 
 
5.d. Risk-preference types 
 
Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010) argue that models should allow for differences in 
preferences. People simply do not have identical preferences so a model that incorporates 
heterogeneity may be superior to one that posits a representative agent. They report two 
distinct groups. The preferences of the majority (73%) of their subjects indicate non-linear 
probability weighting, whereas the minority have preferences that are consistent with 
EUT.23  
 
The last row of Table 4 reports the number of our participants falling into each of three 
preference categories: EUT, PT, or ‘Other.’ The EUT category includes all observations 
that have γ and λ within 10% of unity. PT includes all participants with γ values 10% 
below unity and λ values 10% above unity. ‘Other’ is any observation not categorized as 
PT or EUT. As has been found in past research, a significant minority of our subjects have 
risk preferences approximating EUT-type behavior. We find that of our 146 participants, 
32 (22%) can be characterized as having EUT-type preferences. In fact, 25 of the 32 
participants in the EUT category chose the exact same responses for the three risk-
                                               
23 They and others (e.g., Charupat et al. (2013)) equate EUT-type preferences and “rationality,” unlike the 
more agnostic view we take here.  
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preference questions.24 It is notable that this percentage is quite comparable to the results 
of Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010) and Charupat et al. (2013), who find that 20% and 
29% of subjects, respectively, could be characterized as having EUT-type preferences.  
More subjects, however, had preferences that were consistent with PT (39%), which is 
also consistent with Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010) and Charupat et al. (2013). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that an even greater fraction (40%) had preferences 
that were inconsistent with either EUT or PT. 
 
Table 4 also reports mean values for each of the variables included in our empirical 
analysis by preference category. We observe statistically significant differences in IQ, EQ, 
PA, and SEX across categories. Participants with EUT-type preferences, on average, have 
higher IQ, EQ, and PA, and are more likely to be men. Naturally, the average values of 
the PT parameter deviations (α*, γ*, and λ*) are significantly higher for those who fall 
into the PT preferences category. Finally, it is noteworthy that the time-preference 




We find that both cognitive ability (IQ) and emotional stability (EQ) correlate with 
preferences. Interestingly, EQ appears to be the dominant force in the realm of time 
preference. Those with higher EQ tend to have less present or future bias and a lower rate 
of time preference. In addition, high-EQ males appear to be more patient as they have a 
lower subjective discount rate. On the other hand, IQ is the dominant factor in explaining 
risk preference. The preferences of high-IQ subjects are consistent with less curvature in 
the utility function, probability weighting, and aversion to losses. The preferences of men 
more closely align with traditional, EUT-type preferences.   
                                               
24 By far the most common set of choices for the three risk- preference question sets was the seventh 
choice for the first question set, the first choice (or choice 15 overall) for the second question set (i.e., 
always B), and the second choice (or choice 30 overall) for the third. In fact, 25 of 146 subjects (or 17%) 





Our research has important implications for policymakers whose goal is to encourage 
wealth accumulation among citizens who must fund their own retirement. While 
cognitive ability is often highly prized, alone it may not ensure success. And, neither does 
emotional stability. Our evidence suggests that wise financial planning depends on two 
facets. First, people need to change their savings behavior and emotional intelligence is 
key. Fisher and Montalto (2010) find that those taking the long view save more today. 
Our evidence suggests that emotional stability, as measured by EQ, has a significant 
relationship with time preference. Those with higher EQ are less prone to present/future 
bias and are more patient. Second, people who save must take some risk to grow wealth. 
Our evidence indicates that higher cognitive ability is associated with lower utility 
function curvature, less probability weighting, and reduced aversion to losses. These 
preferences are more closely associated with EUT-type preference and may promote 
wiser investment decisions. 
 
This research also suggests avenues for future theoretical work. While many people have 
preferences that are consistent with expected utility theory or prospect theory, many 
others do not fit neatly in either category. While representative-agent models can provide 
useful insights in some domains, when it comes to understanding individual behavior 





TABLE 1: Variable definitions, descriptive statistics, and correlations 
Panel A is a key describing the variables computed from subject responses collected in the experiment, 
including demographic variables, cognitive ability (IQ), emotional stability (EQ) and risk and time 
preference parameters. Panel B reports descriptive statistics of the variables. Panel C provides correlations. 
 
A. Definition of variables 
 
IQ 
A measure of cognitive ability. IQ is measured based on the response to the 3-
question Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and the value of this variable can 
range from 0-3; where 3 indicates that a participant has answered all three 
questions correctly. A higher IQ value implies higher cognitive ability. 
EQ 
A measure of emotional stability. EQ is 5 minus the average response to 5 
Negative Affectivity (NA) questions from I-PANAS-SF. A 5-point Likert scale 
is used for these questions. A higher value implies higher emotional balance. 
PA 
A measure of positive emotions. PA is the average response to the 5 Positive 
Affectivity (PA) questions from I-PANAS-SF. A 5-point Likert scale is used for 
these questions. A higher value implies a higher tendency to experience 
positive emotions. 
SEX An indicator variable set to 1 if the participant is male and 0 if female. 
AGE Participant age (in years). 
YR The number of years of postsecondary education completed by the participant. 
EDU Number of relevant courses (including finance, economics, statistics and probability) that the participant has completed or is currently enrolled in.  
β 
Time preference parameter. β measures present bias using the general time 
function estimated by Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010). This parameter 
is estimated for each participant using the estimated value of ρ and the 
response to a question set where the participant makes a choice between 
money to be received today and money to be received in one week. 
β* |1-β|.  
ρ 
Time preference parameter. ρ measures the pure rate of time preference. This 
parameter is estimated using a question set where the choice is between 
money to be received in one week and money to be received in two weeks. A 
higher ρ implies a higher deviation from rationality. 
α 
Risk preference parameter. Measures the concavity/convexity of prospect 
theory's utility function for a participant in the positive/negative domain. α is 
estimated for each participant based on their responses to two questions in 
which participants are asked to choose between a series of paired prospects. 
α* |1-α|. 
γ 
Risk preference parameter. Measures the probabilistic insensitivity of Prelec's 
1998 single parameter probability weighting function for a participant in the 
positive/negative domain. γ is estimated for each participant based on their 
responses to the same two questions used to estimate α. 
γ* |1-γ|.  
λ Risk preference parameter. Measures loss aversion. Estimated using the estimates of α and γ along with a question set from the survey.  




B. Descriptive statistics 
 









IQ 1.603 2 0 3 1.047 146 
EQ  2.733 2.8 0.8 3.8 0.543 146 
PA 3.364 3.4 1.4 4.8 0.598 146 
SEX 0.438 0 0 1 0.498 146 
AGE 21.007 21 19 25 1.054 146 
YR 2.949 3 2 6 0.756 146 
EDU 10.048 9 1 29 4.211 146 
β 1.023 1.002 0.871 1.567 0.084 146 
β* 0.039 0.010 0.000 0.567 0.078 146 
ρ 0.099 0.054 0.001 0.454 0.114 146 
α 0.858 0.907 0.033 1.614 0.342 146 
α* 0.293 0.209 0.006 0.967 0.226 146 
γ 0.747 0.735 0.028 1.500 0.302 146 
γ* 0.310 0.273 0.003 0.972 0.243 146 
λ 1.602 1.043 0.084 6.934 1.206 145 




C. Correlation matrix 
 IQ EQ PA SEX AGE YR EDU β β* ρ α α* γ γ* λ λ* 
IQ 1.000                
 -----                
EQ -0.052 1.000               
 0.532 -----               
PA -0.119 0.310 1.000              
 0.153 0.000 -----              
SEX 0.244 0.140 -0.048 1.000             
 0.003 0.091 0.565 -----             
AGE 0.002 0.056 -0.024 0.034 1.000            
 0.976 0.500 0.777 0.687 -----            
YR 0.031 -0.076 0.042 -0.050 0.533 1.000           
 0.713 0.364 0.618 0.551 0.000 -----           
EDU 0.073 0.010 0.017 -0.089 0.098 0.159 1.000          
 0.380 0.900 0.843 0.285 0.240 0.055 -----          
β 0.043 -0.070 0.101 -0.094 0.116 0.081 -0.023 1.000         
 0.608 0.404 0.224 0.260 0.165 0.334 0.779 -----         
β* -0.004 -0.211 0.065 -0.049 0.113 0.153 0.067 0.848 1.000        
 0.961 0.011 0.434 0.554 0.175 0.066 0.424 0.000 -----        
ρ -0.085 -0.124 0.041 0.014 0.091 0.121 0.165 0.468 0.673 1.000       
 0.308 0.135 0.623 0.864 0.272 0.147 0.046 0.000 0.000 -----       
α 0.130 0.122 -0.010 0.113 -0.016 -0.009 0.174 -0.087 -0.148 -0.046 1.000      
 0.117 0.141 0.904 0.173 0.847 0.912 0.036 0.292 0.075 0.578 -----      
α * -0.172 -0.050 0.057 -0.114 -0.083 -0.072 -0.098 0.109 0.145 0.130 -0.656 1.000     
 0.038 0.553 0.492 0.171 0.321 0.390 0.238 0.192 0.082 0.117 0.001 -----     
γ 0.210 0.214 0.100 0.261 0.172 0.036 0.072 -0.024 -0.078 0.006 0.569 -0.501 1.000    
 0.011 0.009 0.228 0.001 0.037 0.671 0.390 0.777 0.347 0.940 0.000 0.000 -----    
γ* -0.169 -0.191 -0.128 -0.265 -0.163 -0.035 -0.116 0.030 0.083 -0.004 -0.609 0.465 -0.917 1.000   
 0.042 0.021 0.124 0.001 0.049 0.674 0.163 0.718 0.321 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.000 -----   
λ -0.160 0.043 0.078 -0.216 -0.021 -0.067 -0.101 -0.013 -0.032 -0.044 0.017 0.269 -0.216 0.199 1.000  
 0.054 0.607 0.351 0.009 0.803 0.419 0.225 0.872 0.697 0.597 0.835 0.001 0.009 0.016 -----  
λ * -0.197 0.016 0.022 -0.223 -0.048 -0.077 -0.104 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.082 0.367 -0.292 0.272 0.940 1.000 
 0.017 0.851 0.796 0.007 0.566 0.355 0.211 0.997 0.954 1.000 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 ----- 
 
Note: Correlations that are significantly different from zero at p <0.10 appear in bold.
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TABLE 2: Time-preference regressions 
 Beta deviation (β*) Rho (ρ) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.07 -0.05 0.13 -0.10 
(0.83) (-0.44) (2.01) (-0.54) 
IQ 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.28) (0.13) (-0.74) (-1.04) 
IQxSEX 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
(1.21) (1.28) (1.15) (1.29) 
EQ -0.04 -0.04* -0.04** -0.04* 
(-1.60) (-1.69) (-2.06) (-1.73) 
EQxSEX -0.02 -0.02 -0.11*** -0.10** 
(-0.55) (-0.47) (-2.70) (-2.24) 
PA 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
(1.48) (1.52) (1.33) (1.29) 
PAxSEX 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
(0.96) (0.92) (0.74) (0.79) 
SEX 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
(-0.14) (0.03) (0.72) (1.01) 
AGE  0.00  0.01 
 (0.37)  (0.76) 
AGExSEX  -0.04**  -0.02 
 (-2.17)  (-1.22) 
YR  0.01  0.01 
 (1.61)  (0.76) 
YRxSEX  0.01  -0.01 
 (0.69)  (-0.21) 
EDU  0.00  0.00 
 (0.69)  (1.47) 
EDUxSEX  0.00  0.00 
  (0.08)  (-0.64) 
!"#### 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.07 
Observations 146 146 146 146 
White Test <0.0001 <0.0001 0.003 0.156 
HCSE Yes Yes Yes No 
 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. The White test indicates p-values for a test 
of the null of homoscedasticity in regression errors. As a result of this test, HCSE indicates whether 
standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. See Panel A of Table 1 for variable definitions. All 
interaction terms are orthogonalized. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%.
 
 
TABLE 3: Risk-preference regressions 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.38 0.84 0.76 1.65 1.21 3.41 
(2.72) (2.35) (6.77) (4.29) (1.91) (2.14) 
IQ -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.18** -0.17** 
(-1.85) (-1.84) (-1.97) (-1.84) (-2.00) (-2.56) 
IQxSEX -0.06 -0.06 -0.08** -0.08** -0.08 -0.11 
(-1.37) (-1.54) (-2.15) (-2.10) (-0.41) (-0.87) 
EQ -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.09 0.07 
(-0.52) (-0.39) (-1.56) (-1.32) (0.48) (0.35) 
EQxSEX -0.01 0.01 0.13** 0.14** 0.23 0.33 
(-0.13) (0.11) (2.17) (2.22) (0.61) (1.04) 
PA 0.01 0.01 -0.06* -0.07** -0.05 -0.05 
(0.37) (0.34) (-1.91) (-2.10) (-0.33) (-0.31) 
PAxSEX -0.10 -0.11* -0.07 -0.07 -0.44 -0.53* 
(-1.53) (-1.80) (-1.04) (-1.14) (-1.36) (-1.77) 
SEX -0.03 -0.03 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.41** -0.42** 
(-0.79) (-0.87) (-2.61) (-2.71) (-2.21) (-2.54) 
AGE  -0.02  -0.04*  -0.09 
 (-1.07)  (-2.16)  (-1.06) 
AGExSEX  -0.06  0.02  -0.11 
 (-1.46)  (0.40)  (-0.61) 
YR  0.00  0.02  -0.02 
 (0.11)  (0.52)  (-0.20) 
YRxSEX  0.05  0.01  0.70*** 
 (0.85)  (0.09)  (3.27) 
EDU  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02 
 (-1.07)  (-1.50)  (-1.14) 
EDUxSEX  -0.06  0.00  0.01 
 (-1.46)  (-0.59)  (0.34) 
!"#### 0.0018 0.004 0.116 0.201 0.039 0.061 
Observations 146 146 146 146 146 146 
White Test 0.000 <0.0001 0.048 0.000 0.348 0.035 
HCSE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. The White test indicates p-values for a test 
of the null of homoscedasticity in regression errors. As a result of this test, HCSE indicates whether 
standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. See Panel A of Table 1 for variable definitions. All 









 F-Test EUT  PT  Other 
IQ 1.875 1.339 1.707 3.240** 
EQ  2.913 2.711 2.655 2.440* 
PA 3.625 3.405 3.179 6.380*** 
SEX 0.625 0.321 0.448 3.960** 
AGE 21.188 20.839 21.069 1.280 
YR 3.000 2.830 3.034 1.140 
EDU 10.813 9.500 10.155 1.020 
β* 0.040 0.033 0.045 0.360 
ρ 0.095 0.097 0.104 0.090 
α* 0.152 0.412 0.255 18.410*** 
γ* 0.054 0.459 0.307 45.980*** 
λ* 0.019 1.555 0.484 35.640*** 
Observations 32 56 58  
 
Notes: The table reports the mean of each variable by preference category. Individuals are categorized as 
having risk preferences in line with expected utility theory (EUT), prospect theory (PT), and other. 
Individuals whose estimates of both λ and γ are within 10% of unity are labelled as EUT, while those with 
estimates of γ 10% below unity and λ 10% above unity are labelled as PT. Individuals who do not 
conform to EUT or PT are categorized as Other. The F-test is for a test of the null hypothesis of equal 
mean values across preference categories. See Panel A of Table 1 for variable definitions. Significant at * 
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No. Question Answer Answer unit 
A 1 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel UPSET? 
 1-5 scale 
1 = NEVER 
5 = ALWAYS 
A 2 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel HOSTILE? 
 As above 
A 3 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel ALERT? 
 As above 
A 4 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel ASHAMED? 
 As above 
A 5 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel INSPIRED? 
 As above 
A 6 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel NERVOUS? 
 As above 
A 7 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel DETERMINED? 
 As above 
A 8 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel ATTENTIVE? 
 As above 
A 9 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel AFRAID? 
 As above 
A 10 Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you 
generally feel ACTIVE? 
 As above 
B 1 A bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
 Cents 
B 2 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
 Minutes 
B 3 In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for 















When you had to choose between Option A and Option B, did you always 
choose A, always choose B, or switch from A to B beginning at a particular 
choice? 
 Choice number 
or A = always A 




When you had to choose between Option A and Option B, did you always 
choose A, always choose B, or switch from A to B beginning at a particular 
choice? 
 Choice number 
or A = always A 




When you had to choose between Option A and Option B, did you always 
choose A, always choose B, or switch from A to B beginning at a particular 
choice? 
 Choice number 
or A = always A 




When you had to choose between Option A and Option B, did you always 
choose A, always choose B, or switch from A to B beginning at a particular 
choice? 
 Choice number 
or A = always A 




When you had to choose between Option A and Option B, did you always 
choose A, always choose B, or switch from A to B beginning at a particular 
choice? 
 Choice number 
or A = always A 
or B = always B 
E 1 What is your sex?  M = male 
or F = female 
E 2 What is your age?  
 
Years 




E 4 How many economics and finance courses have you successfully completed at 
the university level? 
 Number of 
courses 
E 5 How many economics and finance courses are you currently enrolled in?  Number of 
courses 
E 6 How many probability and statistics courses have you successfully completed 
at the university level? 
 Number of 
courses 


















SECTION C: QUESTION SET 1 Choose between Option A and Option B 
  Option A Option B  
Prefer 
A or B? 




Cash with prob 
 
Cash with prob 
Choice 1 $20 30% or $5 70%   $34.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 2 $20 30% or $5 70%   $37.50 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 3 $20 30% or $5 70%   $41.50 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 4 $20 30% or $5 70%   $46.50 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 5 $20 30% or $5 70%   $53.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 6 $20 30% or $5 70%   $62.50 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 7 $20 30% or $5 70%   $75.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 8 $20 30% or $5 70%   $92.50 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 9 $20 30% or $5 70% $110.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 10 $20 30% or $5 70% $150.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 11 $20 30% or $5 70% $200.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 12 $20 30% or $5 70% $300.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 13 $20 30% or $5 70% $500.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
Choice 14 $20 30% or $5 70% $850.00 10% or $2.50 90%  
SECTION C: QUESTION SET 2 Choose between Option A and Option B 
  Option A Option B  
Prefer 
A or B? 
  Cash with prob 
 
Cash with prob Cash with prob 
 
Cash with prob 
Choice 15 $20 90% or $15 10% $27.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 16 $20 90% or $15 10% $28.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 17 $20 90% or $15 10% $29.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 18 $20 90% or $15 10% $30.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 19 $20 90% or $15 10% $31.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 20 $20 90% or $15 10% $32.50 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 21 $20 90% or $15 10% $34.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 22 $20 90% or $15 10% $36.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 23 $20 90% or $15 10% $38.50 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 24 $20 90% or $15 10% $41.50 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 25 $20 90% or $15 10% $45.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 26 $20 90% or $15 10% $50.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 27 $20 90% or $15 10% $55.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
Choice 28 $20 90% or $15 10% $65.00 70% or $2.50 30%  
SECTION C: QUESTION SET 3 Choose between Option A and Option B 
  Option A Option B  
Prefer 
A or B? 










Choice 29    $12.50 50% or ($2.00) 50% $15.00 50% or $(10.50) 50%  
Choice 30 $2.00 50% or ($2.00) 50% $15.00 50% or $(10.50) 50%  
Choice 31 $0.50 50% or ($2.00) 50% $15.00 50% or $(10.50) 50%  
Choice 32 $0.50 50% or ($2.00) 50% $15.00 50% or  $(8.00) 50%  
Choice 33 $0.50 50% or ($2.00) 50% $15.00 50% or  $(8.00) 50%  
Choice 34 $0.50 50% or ($2.00) 50% $15.00 50% or  $(7.00) 50%  




SECTION D: QUESTION SET 1 Choose between Option A and Option B 
 What would you rather have? Prefer 
A or B?  Option A Option B 
Choice 1 $100 in one week $100.25 in 2 weeks  
Choice 2 $100 in one week $100.50 in 2 weeks  
Choice 3 $100 in one week $101 in 2 weeks  
Choice 4 $100 in one week $102 in 2 weeks  
Choice 5 $100 in one week $103 in 2 weeks  
Choice 6 $100 in one week $104 in 2 weeks  
Choice 7 $100 in one week $105 in 2 weeks  
Choice 8 $100 in one week $106 in 2 weeks  
Choice 9 $100 in one week $108 in 2 weeks  
Choice 10 $100 in one week $110 in 2 weeks  
Choice 11 $100 in one week $112 in 2 weeks  
Choice 12 $100 in one week $114 in 2 weeks  
Choice 13 $100 in one week $117 in 2 weeks  
Choice 14 $100 in one week $120 in 2 weeks  
Choice 15 $100 in one week $125 in 2 weeks  
Choice 16 $100 in one week $130 in 2 weeks  
Choice 17 $100 in one week $140 in 2 weeks  
Choice 18 $100 in one week $150 in 2 weeks  
SECTION D: QUESTION SET 2 Choose between Option A and Option B 
 What would you rather have? Prefer 
A or B?  Option A Option B 
Choice 19 $100 today $101 in one week  
Choice 20 $100 today $102 in one week  
Choice 21 $100 today $103 in one week  
Choice 22 $100 today $104 in one week  
Choice 23 $100 today $105 in one week  
Choice 24 $100 today $107.50 in one week  
Choice 25 $100 today $110 in one week  
Choice 26 $100 today $115 in one week  
Choice 27 $100 today $120 in one week  
Choice 28 $100 today $125 in one week  
Choice 29 $100 today $130 in one week  
Choice 30 $100 today $135 in one week  
Choice 31 $100 today $140 in one week  
Choice 32 $100 today $145 in one week  
Choice 33 $100 today $150 in one week  
Choice 34 $100 today $160 in one week  






















SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS (S1) 
 
1. Thank you for attending this survey session.  Your participation will be of great 
benefit to us in our research into financial decision-making.  You will be paid a $15 
participation fee.  Proper, careful completion of this survey, which consists of 25 
questions, should take no more than 45 minutes.  During this session, there is to be 
no use of electronic devices such as computers and phones.  All phones should be 
turned off (not just set to vibrate).  And there should be no communication of any 
kind with other participants.  The only aids allowed are writing utensils, scrap paper 
and (if you wish) a calculator.   
 
2. The 25 questions of this survey appear in 5 sections, Section A to Section E.  The 3 
questions of Section C and the 2 questions of Section D are actually closely-related 
question sets, and are described carefully below.  The remaining questions are self-
explanatory and require little explanation.   
 
3. The two components of financial decision-making that we will explore in this 
session are called risk preference and time preference.  Your risk preference is how 
comfortable you are with risk taking.  Your time preference reveals how much you 
wish to be compensated for receiving money later rather than sooner.  Risk 
preference is investigated in Section C and time preference is addressed in Section D.  
There are no correct or incorrect answers to these questions since answers are based 
on personal preferences. 
 
4. All answers should be clearly written in pen in the appropriate answer boxes on the 
two-sided SURVEY ANSWER SHEET provided.  Please pay careful attention to the 
units (e.g., years, cents, etc.).  The questions must be done in order.  Also, after 
writing in an answer, please do not go back and change it as you move to later 
questions.  If, however, you were confused and erroneously wrote an answer and 
wish to immediately change it before moving to the next question, raise your hand 
and an experimenter will initial the change.  
 
5. The rest of these instructions guide you through the survey.  Please read the 
description of each section before you answer the questions of that section. 
 
6. The 13 questions in Sections A and B explore your personality/mood.   
 
7. Section A: This section has 10 questions.  Think about yourself, and how you 
normally feel.  You are asked to say how often you feel a certain way.  Please answer 
these questions to the best of your ability using a 5-point scale.  If you always feel a 
certain way ’5’ should be your answer.  If you never feel that way ‘1‘ should be your 
answer.  Frequency of feelings between these extremes should be answered with ’4‘ 
or ’3‘ or ’2,‘ with higher numbers reflecting higher frequency.  
 
8. Section B: The 3 items in this section vary in difficulty.  Try to answer as best you 





9. Section C: The 3 question sets of Section C explore your risk preference.  Refer to 
page 1 of the two-sided QUESTION SET SHEET.  Let’s make sure you understand 
these question sets and the choices that you need to make.     
 
10. Begin with Section C: Question Set 1.  First look at this question set and then read 
the description below.  You have to make 14 choices – sounds like a lot of work but 
it’s actually much simpler than it sounds.  Consider Choice 1.  You have to choose 
between 2 options, A and B.  These options are both gambles.  If you choose A, you 
have a 30% chance of getting $20 and a 70% chance of receiving $5.  Or you could 
choose Option B.  If you choose B, you have a 10% chance of getting $34 and a 90% 
chance of receiving $2.50.  Do you prefer Option A or Option B?  Remember there is 
no right answer.  It’s just a matter of personal preference. 
 
11. Before choosing it is important to know that your answer is not merely hypothetical.  
Four students will be randomly selected at the end of this session, and will (if they 
so choose) be allowed to participate in either a Risk Preference Game or a Time 
Preference Game.  The 2 students who are selected to participate in the Risk 
Preference Game will have one of their Section C choices determine an actual 
payment made to them (as will be described in detail later).  Since you don’t know in 
advance which row (choice) may matter, you are of course well advised to answer 
all questions by using your true preferences.     
 
12. Now go ahead and make your choice.  You should write your answer (A or B) in the 
last column of Choice 1 of the QUESTION SET SHEET. 
 
13. Suppose you prefer Option A for Choice 1.  Now go to Choice 2.  Notice Option A 
does not change.  The only thing about Option B that changes is the high-cash 
outcome, which is now $37.50 instead of $34.  Obviously Option B is more attractive 
than it was before.  Since you chose Option A for Choice 1 there is a chance that you 
will switch preference, now preferring Option B to Option A.  Suppose instead you 
continue to prefer Option A.  Then go on to Choice 3.  Once gain the only thing that 
changes is that Option B becomes more attractive, creating the possibility that you 
might switch preference from A to B.  The pattern now becomes clear.  As you move 
down the rows (choices), Option B looks better and better and assuming you initially 
preferred A there may come a particular row (say row 9 or Choice 9) where you first 
prefer B.  After that point, it is only logical that you will continue to prefer B because 
B continues to become more attractive.  You should now be able to fill in ‘A’ or ‘B’ in 
all the QUESTION SET SHEET rows for this question set (C-1). 
 
14. Turning to the SURVEY ANSWER SHEET, locate the relevant answer box for C-1.  
You are prompted that there are three possibilities.  You might always prefer Option 
A to Option B – in which case you write ‘A’ in the answer box.  Or you might always 
prefer Option B to Option A – in which case you write ‘B’ in the answer box.  Or you 
might first prefer Option A but then at a certain point switch to Option B.  If this 
switch occurs at Choice 9, you would write ‘9’ in the answer box.  Now answer 





15. Note that for the rest of the questions of Section C and for both of the Section D 
questions the same pattern will hold.  Specifically, as you move down the rows 
(choices) Option B will become more and more attractive relative to Option A.  This 
means that there will be three possibilities: you might always prefer A; you might 
always prefer B; or you might first prefer A but then switch preference to B at a 
particular row (choice). 
     
16. The next question set -- Section C: Question Set 2 – is similar in structure, and so it 
requires little further explanation.  While the cash outcomes and probabilities are 
different, it remains true that the only thing that changes from row to row (choice to 
choice) is one of the Option B cash outcomes, with as before B becoming increasingly 
attractive as you move down the rows (choices).  Note that the row (choice) 
numbering continues from the previous question.  Please look at Section C: Question 
Set 2, make your choices, and provide your answer on the SURVEY ANSWER 
SHEET according to your preference. 
 
17. The final question set of this section, Section C: Question Set 3, is again quite similar 
except for one important difference.  The difference is that in all cases one of the cash 
outcomes is negative.  For example, consider Choice 29.  Selecting Option A means 
you are accepting a gamble with a 50% chance of receiving $12.50 and a 50% chance 
of losing $2.  Accepting Option B on the other hand means you are accepting a 
gamble with a 50% chance of receiving $15 and a 50% chance of losing $10.50.  As 
one moves down the rows (choices) a single cash outcome from one of the options 
(either from Option A or Option B) changes.  Still, as before, as you move down the 
rows (choices), B becomes increasingly more attractive relative to A.  Please look at 
Section C: Question Set 3 now, make your choices, and provide your answer on the 
SURVEY ANSWER SHEET according to your preference. 
 
18. As was said earlier, 2 students will be randomly selected to participate in the Risk 
Preference Game (if they so desire).  This will be done as follows.  All students will 
be at numbered desks (say, 1-50 if there are 50 students participating in a session).  
At the end we will ask a student in attendance to blindly select 2 cards from a deck 
of numbered cards.  The students whose desk numbers come up will be able to 
participate in the Risk Preference Game.  (The identical procedure will be used for 
the Time Preference Game.)  If they choose to participate, these 2 students will be 
able to receive a payment from one of the rows (choices) in Section C according to 
their stated preferences and a draw from the relevant probability distribution.  More 
specifically, after these students are selected, they will be asked to choose one of 35 
cards which are numbered 1 to 35.  Their card selection will then signify which row 
(i.e., Choices 1-35) they will receive payments from.  Suppose one of these 2 students 
selects card #20, and for this row (Choice 20) she expressed a preference for Option 
B over Option A.  Then she gets to “play” Option B.  Using a random device she will 
receive $32.50 with a 70% probability and $2.50 with a 30% probability.  Note that 
the students participating in the game will receive both their Risk Preference Game 
payment and their $15 participation fee.  As stated earlier, since you don’t know in 
advance which row (choice) may matter, you are of course well advised to answer 





19. One thing that needs to be stressed is that the students who are randomly chosen 
to participate in the Risk Preference Game have the option to decline.  (The same 
is true with the Time Preference game, but in reality it would always be unwise to 
decline participation in this case because all outcomes are positive.)  With this in 
mind note that if cards #29-35 are chosen then these students may face negative 
payments.  In other words, they may lose money.  Note that since 7 of 35 rows (20%) 
potentially lead to losses, and when these rows are selected losses occur 50% of the 
time, this implies that one should expect that losses will on average happen 10% 
(20% * 50%) of the time.  But it is important to understand that the worst negative 
outcome is -$10.50.  So if even if this occurs, the worst that can happen is the student 
in question will end up with $4.50, which is the participation fee minus the worst 
possible outcome ($15.00 - $10.50 = $4.50).  Still, if a student is fearful of such 
negative events he/she may simply decline to participate.  This is a private decision 
and will not occur with other students witnessing it.  
 
20. Section D: These 2 question sets explore your time preference.  Refer to page 2 of the 
two-sided QUESTION SET SHEET.  Let’s make sure you understand these question 
sets and the choices that you need to make. 
 
21. As before it is important to take your choices seriously because they are not merely 
hypothetical.  Again, as previously noted, 2 of the 4 students randomly selected at 
the end of each the session will be allowed to participate in the Time Preference 
Game.  This means their Section D choices will be paid out to them, again based on a 
random selection of the 35 choices (rows) making up the two Section D question sets. 
 
22. Like Section C, you have to express a preference for Option A vs. Option B over a 
series of choices.  Also like Section C, as you move down the rows (choices) Option B 
becomes relatively more attractive vs. Option A.  Note that the choices are simpler in 
the sense that no gambles are involved.  In all cases you have to express a preference 
for $x received today or at some future time vs. $y received at a more distant future 
time.  It’s as simple as that.   
 
23. Begin with Section D: Question Set 1, Choice 1.  The choice is between $100 
received in one week (Option A) vs. $100.25 received in 2 weeks (Option B).  Say you 
prefer Option A.  As you continue down the rows (choices) notice that Option B 
becomes increasingly more attractive.  This is because in the case of Option B you 
receive more and more money in 2 weeks.  As a result at some point you may switch 
from Option A to Option B.  When this happens you know that you will continue to 
prefer B as you move down the rows (choices). 
 
24. To clarify payment timing for those choosing to participate in the Time Preference 
Game, if you are due to receive a payment today you can pick it up between 4:00pm 
and 4:30pm today in DSB/303.  If a payment is specified as “in one week” this 
means payment is made one week from today between 4:00pm and 4:30pm in 
DSB/303, while if a future payment is specified as “in 2 weeks” this means payment 





25. Turning to the SURVEY ANSWER SHEET you will notice that once again there are 3 
possibilities.  You might always prefer A to B – in which case you write ‘A’ in the 
answer box.  Or you might always prefer B to A – in which case you write ‘B’ in the 
answer box.  Or you might first prefer A but then at a certain point switch to B.  If 
this switch occurs at Choice 4, you would write ‘4’ in the answer box.  Please look at 
Section D: Question Set 1 again, make your choices, and provide your answer on the 
SURVEY ANSWER SHEET according to your preference. 
 
26. Section D: Question Set 2 operates in a similar fashion.  Option A always entails 
receiving $100 today.  Option B involves receiving more than $100 in one week.  
Since this amount increases as you go down the rows (choices) Option B (as 
elsewhere) becomes more and more attractive.  Please look at this question set, make 
your choices, and provide your answer on the SURVEY ANSWER SHEET according 
to your preference.           
 
27. Section E: We end with some basic demographic questions on your gender, age and 
educational background.  Please answer these 7 questions of Section E now. 
 
28. You have now finished the survey.  Please check that you have answered all 
questions, and that your printing can be read.  While you wait for everyone else to 
finish the survey, we kindly ask you to remain silent and to not use any electronic 
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